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ABSTRACT 
Threat-related information strongly biases attention, particularly for high anxious individuals. 
It is less clear though what the consequences of attentional capture by threat are, and how 
this influences subsequent visual processing. This study examined how capture by threat 
influences visual search when attributes related to a threat reappear as task-irrelevant 
information. In Experiment 1, participants completed a search task preceded by task-
irrelevant face cues on each trial expressing neutral, happy, or angry emotions. Faces were 
filtered to appear in different colors, where this color could match a non-emotional distractor 
object in the upcoming search display. While the color of neutral/happy face cues had no 
impact on performance, there was evidence that angry face colors delayed reaction times 
when this color reappeared, driven by a positive correlation between costs and individual 
differences in trait anxiety. Experiment 2 assessed whether this phenomenon would be more 
readily observed when designating face cues task-relevant. When participants attended to 
and memorized faces for occasional probe trials, color biases were now evident irrespective 
of the emotional valence of face cues and unaffected by trait anxiety levels. These results 
suggest that task-irrelevant threat stimuli are granted privileged depth of processing by high 
anxious individuals, triggering biased attention towards features related to this object. Such 
biases are not dependent on threat per se, occurring for other objects voluntarily processed 
to similar depth regardless of personality factors. This highlights that anxiety-related 
phenomena, such as delayed disengagement of spatial attention from threat, may stem from 
task-irrelevant visual working memory representation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Selective attention enables individuals to focus on certain information in lieu of 
other signals. Which stimuli ultimately receive attentional priority is seen to depend on both 
top-down factors, such as stimuli that match the content we are actively looking for, but 
also bottom-up factors, such as highly salient stimuli that are able to capture attention 
despite being potentially task-irrelevant. This dichotomy however may be too simplistic, as 
attention can also be rapidly allocated to information that seems neither relevant to our 
current goals nor physically salient (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). A prime 
example of this point comes from the observation that motivationally-salient stimuli, 
particularly threat-related cues, are able to strongly compete for selection. Threat-related 
target objects are more readily detected during visual search (e.g., Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 
2001), and task-irrelevant threat conversely causes pronounced costs to performance 
efficiency (e.g., Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004).  
 While the guidance of attention by threat-related information could be interpreted 
as a hardwired response in the visual system to rapidly process certain complex objects that 
denote danger (see e.g., Gomes, Soares, Silva, & Silva, 2018, for an example of snake 
images), such a mechanism has proved controversial (see e.g., Gayet, Stein, & Peelen, in 
press). Moreover, the ubiquity of rapid biases in visual attention to threat has been 
challenged by the observation that they appear to readily occur only for certain individuals. 
Much evidence of threat-related biases in attention comes from studies that have assessed 
particular anxious populations, such as individuals with specific phobias, clinically anxious 
groups including those with Generalized Anxiety Disorder or Social Anxiety Disorder, and 
individuals high in anxious personality traits (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
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Kranenburg, & IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009, for reviews). The 
consensus from such work is that biases in attention towards threat are pronounced in 
anxious groups, mainly demonstrated by reduced ability to ignore threat-related distractors 
in selective attention tasks (e.g., Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996; Rudaizky, Basanovic, 
& MacLeod, 2014). While this could be viewed as evidence that threat biases are simply 
exacerbated within anxious populations, there is in fact weak evidence to suggest that 
individuals characterized by low levels of anxiety exhibit any attentional bias to threat at all 
(see Bar-Haim et al., 2007, for meta-analysis). This highlights that prioritization of threat-
related signals in the visual environment strongly depends on personality factors, spurring 
the question why anxious individuals demonstrate such attentional biases. Proposed 
theoretical accounts have emphasized that these could stem from enhanced pre-attentive 
processing of threat which interacts with one’s internal anxiety level to elicit capture (e.g., 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), or that anxious 
individuals may at some level, explicit or implicit, hold a motivation or goal to detect 
potential danger in the environment and actively attend to confirmatory signals (e.g., 
Eysenck, 1992; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Matthews & Wells, 2000).  
  Regardless of the disagreement over the precise mechanisms underpinning rapid 
attentional biases, all models can accommodate the finding of enhanced attentional capture 
by threat among anxious individuals. Far less research, however, has examined what the 
consequences of these biases in attention are; anxious individuals appear to rapidly allocate 
selective attention to threat, but what implication does this have if any to subsequent visual 
attention processing? One well-documented consequence of attentional capture by threat 
is a subsequent difficulty in successfully disengaging spatial attention from it towards other 
stimuli (e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & 
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Wiersema, 2006; Sheppes, Luria, Fukuda, & Gross, 2013), suggesting that attended threat 
stimuli are not just prioritized when competing for attention but are also able to ‘hold’ 
attention post-capture. This results in costs to other stimuli, such as discrimination ability 
for objects at other locations being impaired when attention is occupied at the location of a 
threat stimulus (Ferneyhough, Kim, Phelps, & Carrasco, 2013).  
 If anxious individuals not only rapidly attend to threat, but also subsequently ‘hold’ 
and continue selectively processing this information, this suggests a disruption to 
attentional processing and a prolonged prioritization of a threat stimulus. This could stem 
from anxious individuals not only being drawn to threat, but narrowing in spatial attention 
when a threat is detected (see Easterbrook, 1959; Eysenck, 1992). Another possibility is 
that, once threat captures spatial attention, inhibition is required to discontinue and 
withdraw attention from its location, a process that may generally be impaired among 
highly anxious individuals (e.g., Fox, 1994; see also Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007). These accounts can explain why spatial attention to other visual information is 
impaired following the processing of threat, as attention remains fixated at the location of 
the threat. However, such emphasis on the role of spatial attention also implies that threat 
processing is somewhat superficial; threat draws spatial attention to its location and this is 
subsequently difficult to override, but there is little speculation regarding what narrowed 
spatial attention to threat might confer other than to merely expedite alerting an individual 
to the location of a danger.   
 If attention is preferentially allocated to and held by threat, what other 
consequences can be observed? It is well-established that attention is capable of being 
applied in both a spatial fashion and non-spatially by basic features (e.g., color; shape; 
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orientation; size). This is vital in situations such as visual search, where by definition the 
location of an object being searched for is not known in advance, and efficient guidance of 
attention can only be based on known characteristics of the target object (e.g., Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1992; Wolfe, 2007). Selectivity on the basis of features results in biases of 
attention towards any features that match the current search goal, which for example when 
searching for a red letter can result in distraction by other task-irrelevant red stimuli but not 
blue or green items (e.g., Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002). 
Importantly, feature biases can also operate independently to spatial influences on 
attention, where for instance knowing that a red target item can only appear at a particular 
location does not necessarily prevent attentional capture by irrelevant red items at other 
locations (e.g., Berggren, Jenkins, McCants, & Eimer, 2017; Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004; 
Serences & Boynton, 2007).  
 As feature-based attention is believed to generally operate in a spatially-global 
manner (but see Leonard, Balestreri, & Luck, 2015), selectively processing a threatening 
stimulus could narrow or prioritize not only spatial attention to the item’s location, but also 
feature-based attention to the threatening object’s content. As a result, selective attention 
to these features would increase the likelihood that other objects in the environment 
sharing these features, even at other locations, compete for attention; effectively an 
‘associative threat bias’ towards threat-related features. If this is the case, it provides 
implications that biased attention to threat involves not only a superficial biasing of spatial 
attention to a threatening object’s location, but also that such objects’ features are heavily 
prioritized and can elicit additional biases to other objects related to the threat stimulus’ 
attributes. To examine this, the present study employed a visual search task where 
participants were asked to locate a target on the basis of its orientation (i.e., a square with a 
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gap in its top or bottom side, presented among non-target squares with left/right gaps). All 
items in these search displays were presented in different colors, though this was unrelated 
to the participants’ primary task. Prior to each search display, a pair of face cues were 
presented, expressing neutral, happy, or angry emotions. Importantly, these face cues were 
filtered to appear in different colors, and on half of trials this color appeared as a non-target 
square in the subsequent search display (color-present trials) or did not appear (color-
absent trials). In Experiment 1, these face cues were irrelevant to the task at hand, and 
participants were simply instructed to ignore them.  
 If threat strongly competes for selection, angry faces would be expected to capture 
spatial attention. This could be reflected by a general main effect of face cue valence on 
performance, as there is some evidence that threat image cues may generally slow 
participant response time to immediately succeeding stimuli (e.g., Wilkowski & Robinson, 
2006). However, other work using specifically threatening face cues have not shown any 
general reaction time cost in selective attention tasks (e.g., Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). 
Importantly though, if attentional capture by threat not only narrows spatial attention but 
also involves prioritization in feature-based attention, the incidental color of threatening 
faces should become prioritized in a spatially-global manner, resulting in new objects 
containing this color competing for attentional selection and causing performance costs 
when presented as an irrelevant object in search displays. Moreover, given that threat 
biases in attention have been suggested to occur only for individuals reporting high anxious 
personality traits (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), this effect would be expected to be modulated by 
participants’ trait anxiety levels.  
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-eight participants were initially recruited to participate in the study via online 
advertisement. Of these, two participants were excluded and replaced with new participant 
data due to performance at chance-level accuracy in one or more conditions. Of the final 
sample (M age = 26 years, SD = 6; 24 male; all right-handed), all participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All study procedures involving participants were 
approved by the departmental ethical committee.  
 To determine the desired sample size, the correlation coefficient associated with a 
previous study demonstrating a significant relationship between selectivity in spatial 
attention following a threat stimulus and trait anxiety was utilized (r = .36; Ferneyhough et 
al., 2013). Analysis using G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
suggested that, assuming a model of equal predictive strength for feature-based selectivity, 
a sample size of 58 participants was necessary with an alpha level of .05 and power of 0.8 to 
demonstrate a similar relationship.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 The experimental task was programmed and executed using E-Prime 2.0 software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Participants sat at a viewing distance of approximately 90 
cm. All stimuli were presented on a black background, with a small grey fixation cross 
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appearing constantly throughout a block. Face stimuli consisted of eight identities (4 male), 
each displaying a neutral, happy, or angry expression. Six face identities were taken from 
the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009) and two from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
database. All face stimuli were cropped using an oval template so that only the face was 
visible, and measured 1.59 x 2.55° of visual angle. Two identical stimuli were presented on 
each trial either side of fixation at an eccentricity of 1.91° measured from fixation to the 
outer edge of each face. Face stimuli were filtered from greyscale to add color tints: red (CIE 
coordinates: .605/.322), orange (.543/.409), green (.296/.604), blue (.169/.152), and 
magenta (.270/.134). Search display objects (0.89 x 0.89°) were square boxes, each 
containing a small gap (0.13°) in one of their sides. The target contained a gap in its top or 
bottom side, and non-targets left or right side. Objects were presented at the four cardinal 
points from fixation at an eccentricity of 0.95° measured from fixation to the edge of the 
object, and could appear in the same colors as the filters used for face stimuli at the same 
RGB values. All colors were matched for luminance (14 cd/m2). To measure individual 
differences in trait anxiety, participants completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), which measures self-reported ratings 
of anxious disposition and mood. This questionnaire is widely used in the literature and has 
good validity and reliability.  
 Participants completed the anxiety questionnaire prior to the experimental task. 
Each block began with an initial 1000 ms blank screen period before the start of the first 
trial. Each trial began with a face cue display (50 ms), followed by a 750 ms inter-stimulus 
interval. Search displays were then presented for 150 ms followed by a further 1850 ms 
blank screen, creating a 2000 ms response window. Participants were told that face cue 
displays could show faces of different genders, expressions, and were filtered to appear in 
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different colors, but that both faces shown in a display would be identical. They were 
instructed to ignore the face images and maintain fixation. When the search display 
appeared, they were tasked to locate the object with a gap in its top or bottom side, 
responding by pressing the ‘2’ or ‘0’ key on the numeric keypad respectively, as quickly and 
as accurately as possible.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 Following practice, participants completed four experimental blocks of 60 trials each. 
Trials within each block were randomly selected from a counterbalanced list of 240 trials. 
This counterbalanced face cue expression (3), face identity (8), face color (5), and color 
presence (2). Target location and orientation were randomized. On color-present trials, the 
color of the face cue reappeared in search displays as a non-target object along with three 
other randomly chosen colors. On color-absent trials, the color of the face cue did not 
appear in search displays and the four remaining colors were randomly allocated to the 
target or non-target objects.  
 
Results 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
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 Within-subjects: Table 1 presents mean reaction time data from correct-response 
trials along with error rate percentages for each experimental condition. Reaction time data 
were entered into a 3x2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the factors Face Expression 
(Neutral, Happy, Angry) and Color Presence (Present, Absent). This showed no significant 
main effect of Face Expression (F(2,114) = 1.05, p = .35) or Color Presence (F(1,57) = 1.19, p 
= .28). There was, however, a trend for a two-way interaction (F(2,114) = 2.36 p = .099, ηp2 = 
.04, 95% CI [.00, .12])1, which suggested that a color presence effect was more evident 
following angry face cues (M diff = 15 ms) than following neutral or happy face cues (M diff 
= -5 & 4 ms). A matching ANOVA analysis of error rate data also showed no reliable main 
effects (F’s < 1) or interaction (F(2,114) = 1.19, p = .31).  
 Trait anxiety: To assess whether any biases were related to trait anxiety, trait anxiety 
score (TAS) was added as a covariate factor within the ANOVA model. This showed no 
significant three-way interaction between Face Expression x Color Presence x TAS (F(2,112) 
= 1.36, p = .26)2. Given the a priori hypothesis however and sample size calculation based on 
a predicted correlation between TAS and color presence costs following angry face cues, 
correlations were conducted on color presence effects for each face expression level. There 
was no association between trait anxiety level and color presence effects following neutral 
(r < .10) or happy (r = .199, N = 58, p = .13) faces. Following angry faces, however, there was 
a significant positive correlation between trait anxiety level and color presence costs (r = 
 
1 Note that, if collapsing RTs on neutral and happy expression trials to conserve statistical power, this 
interaction was significant at an alpha level of .05, (F(1,57) = 4.56, p = .04, ηp2 = .07, 95% CI [.00,.22]). Color 
presence costs following an angry face cue were statistically reliable (M diff = 15 ms; t(57) = 2.35, p = .02, d = 
.44, 95% CI [.06, .81]), whereas no cost was evident following a non-threatening face cue (M diff = 0 ms; t < 1).  
2 Similar to the main ANOVA analysis, collapsing neutral and happy expression trials resulted in evidence for a 
three-way interaction with TAS (F(1,56) = 3.04, p = .04, one-tailed).  
12 
 
.382, N = 58, p = .003; see Figure 2). There were no associations between anxiety level and 
error rate validity effects (r’s < ±.10).  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
  
Discussion of Experiment 1 
 Across the sample as a whole, the results of Experiment 1 provided weak support for 
the hypothesis that the capture of attention by threat would elicit biases in feature-based 
attention to threat-associated color features. While there was evidence for a color presence 
cost following angry face cues, with slower RTs when the color of this face reappeared as a 
non-target object in search displays, and little evidence for this following neutral or happy 
face cues, the interaction between color presence and face expression was marginal. 
However, there was evidence to suggest that this modest overall relationship was due to 
strong individual differences related to participants’ trait anxiety levels. When examining 
this, trait anxiety scores positively correlated with color presence costs following angry face 
cues. This supports previous evidence that biases in attention related to threat may be 
critically dependent on individual differences in trait anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Findings additionally suggest that biases in attention towards threat may not only result in 
prioritization of spatial attention to the location of a threat stimulus, but can equally elicit 
prioritization of a threat object’s attributes at the level of feature-based attention, resulting 
in additional biases towards these features comprised within a new object even when this 
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object is not itself threatening. Indeed, it is notable that the effect size of the threat-
associated color bias observed in relation to anxiety was almost exactly as predicted when 
using a previous study that examined biases in spatial attention as the basis for a priori 
power estimation (Ferneyhough et al., 2013, where r = .36 vs. r = .38 in the current 
experiment). This suggests that, following the capture of attention by threat, processing of 
this stimulus and its constituent features becomes prioritized at the level of selective 
attention in a similar manner to prioritization observed in spatial attention.  
 Based on Experiment 1’s results, a key question is why color presence costs following 
an angry face cue were mainly driven by individual differences in trait anxiety, as opposed to 
occurring across the sample at a similar magnitude. One possibility is that, if anxiety predicts 
to what extent a task-irrelevant threatening face cue will capture attention to begin with 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007), individuals at lower trait anxiety levels may simply be better able to 
ignore these initial cues thereby precluding any association forming between the affective 
object and its color feature value. On the basis of this account, all individuals in principle 
could show a strong and rapid bias in attention towards threat-associated color objects 
provided initial threatening cues do capture attention and are not ignored. A second 
possibility is that, as face cues were presented alone before the visual search display, all 
participants may have allocated attention to the face cues, but trait anxiety predicted 
whether or not an active association was formed between the threatening stimulus and its 
color that would lead to a rapid associated bias in attention. In other words, anxiety may be 
the crucial factor in the formation of the threat-color association in order to subsequently 
bias attention.  
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The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine these possibilities. Participants completed 
a similar visual search task as in Experiment 1, but were now asked to actively attend to and 
memorize the identity of face cues. On 2/3 of trials, following the presentation of face cues, 
visual search displays appeared as in Experiment 1, and participants were instructed to find 
the target object and discard the memorized face cue information. On the remaining 1/3 of 
trials though, instead of being presented with a search display, participants were shown a 
probe display containing either an identical or different face cue identity, and were asked to 
respond to whether the probe identity was a match or mismatch. As face images were now 
task-relevant, there was no incentive to ignore angry face cues, therefore allowing a test of 
whether or not threat-associated color biases in attention may be elicited regardless of the 
influence of trait provided initial threat cues engage attention. If this is the case, a clear 
color presence cost following angry face cues should be evident across the sample, and 
there may now be no evidence for a modulation by trait anxiety. Alternatively, if associative 
attentional biases depend not only on the engagement of attention and encoding of face 
cues but also on the formation of an active association between the threatening object and 
the color feature, then it is possible that effects might again be mainly driven by individual 
differences in trait anxiety.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants 
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Fifty-eight participants were initially recruited to take part in Experiment 2. Six 
participants though were excluded and replaced with new participant data due to average 
accuracy in the search task falling below a training threshold of 75% (see below). This gave a 
final sample of 58 participants in line with Experiment 1 (M age = 24 years, SD = 5, 14 male; 
9 left-handed). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 To determine sample size, the key finding of Experiment 1, a positive correlation 
between trait anxiety and biased attention to threat-associated color objects (r = .382), was 
used for power analysis. Achieved power in Experiment 1 was 0.85, and so was well-
powered. For sake of comparison between experiments, the same sample size as 
Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 Stimuli and procedure matched Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Only 
neutral and angry face cues were used in this experiment. Each trial began with a face cue 
display, followed by the inter-stimulus interval. On two-thirds of trials, search displays were 
then presented as in Experiment 1. On the remaining one-third of trials, however, a memory 
probe display was presented. This was similar to the face cue display except that the faces 
shown appeared in grayscale. While the probe face always presented the same neutral or 
angry expression as the cue faces, the identity of the stimulus could match or mismatch the 
identity shown in the cue display. Participants responded to the probe stimulus by pressing 
the ‘a’ or ‘s’ key on the keyboard with their left middle and index fingers respectively. 
Participants were instructed that, following the presentation of the face cue, they would on 
each trial either be tested on their memory or be presented with a search display, which 
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designated that information held in memory could be discarded. Both tasks were 
emphasized for speed and accuracy, though participants were made aware that search 
displays were more likely to occur across trials than memory probe displays.  
 Due to the dual-task procedure of this experiment, pilot testing showed that 
performance in the search task suffered. Participants therefore completed a training phase 
prior to completing the main experiment. They first completed training where all face cues 
were followed by search displays. They then completed additional practice where all trials 
contained memory probe displays. Finally, they practiced short blocks of both tasks together 
until they scored above a threshold 75% average accuracy in search performance. As face 
cues were presented briefly, memory performance was anticipated to be poor and so 
average performance did not inform training, provided participants responded on all trials. 
Following the completion of practice, participants completed four experimental blocks each 
containing 60 trials. This followed a similar structure to Experiment 1, except that happy 
face cue trials were now effectively replaced with memory probe trials (i.e., 80 in total). 
These were equally likely to probe memory for neutral or angry face cues, and was also 
counterbalanced to the prior cue’s face color (5) and identity (8).  
 
Results 
 Memory test: As anticipated, memory performance in the task was generally poor 
given the short exposure duration, with average error rates of 39 % in a two-alternative 
forced choice response. Nevertheless, error rates were significantly lower than chance for 
both neutral and angry faces (t’s > 4.90, p’s < .001). Directly comparing neutral and angry 
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face memory scores, there was no significant difference on error rates (M = 40 vs. 38 %; 
t(57) = 1.09, p = .28).  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Search test: Table 2 presents mean reaction time and error rate data across each 
condition. Reaction times were entered into a 2x2 ANOVA with the factors Face Expression 
(Neutral, Angry) and Color Presence (Present, Absent). This showed no significant main 
effect of Face Expression (F < 1). However, there was a significant main effect of Color 
Presence (F(1,57) = 5.04, p = .03, ηp2 = .08, 95% CI [.00, .23]), indicating that RTs were 
generally slower on color-present versus absent trials (M = 810 vs. 798 ms). Importantly 
though, while there was a tendency for larger color presence effects following angry (M diff 
= 16 ms) versus neutral (M diff = 7 ms) face cues, there was no evidence for a reliable Face 
Expression x Color Presence interaction (F(1,57) = .65, p = .43). A matching analysis of error 
rate data showed no significant main effects or interaction (all F’s < 1). 
 Trait anxiety: Entering TAS within an ANCOVA model showed no significant 
interaction with Face Expression and Color Presence (F < 1). Correlating trait anxiety score 
with color presence effects showed no significant association following neutral (r = .127, N = 
58, p = .34) or angry (r = .083, N = 58, p = .54) face cues. Likewise, there was also no 
association on error rate data following neutral (r = -.188, N = 58, p = .16) or angry (r = .097, 
N = 58, p = .47) face cues. Finally, anxiety score did not predict error rates in face memory 
for either neutral (r = .093, N = 58, p = .49) or angry (r = -.034, N = 58, p = .80) stimuli.  
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Discussion of Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 showed a very different pattern of results compared to Experiment 1. 
By making face cues task-relevant and requiring memory encoding due to occasional test 
probes, there was no within-subjects evidence of a specific cost by color objects related to a 
preceding threat stimulus, and nor was there evidence of an association with trait anxiety. 
Instead, there was now a general color presence cost, with RTs slower when the color of a 
face cue reappeared as a non-target object within search displays. Critically, this cost was 
not significantly affected by the emotional valence of the face cue. Note that as exposure 
durations and procedures were similar to those in Experiment 1, this result is extremely 
unlikely to be due to any low-level visual priming of a face cue’s color. Results instead 
suggest that actively attending to and encoding face cue stimuli into visual memory was 
sufficient to elicit a color-associated bias in attention, even when the initial cue stimulus was 
not threatening. This implies a role of the depth of processing that an initial cue enjoys in 
order to determine associative attentional biases, rather than a cue’s threat value per se. 
This is discussed in further detail below. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The goal of the present study was to examine the consequences that attentional 
biases to threat may have on subsequent attentional selection. Previous evidence has 
shown that objects holding threat value strongly compete for and rapidly bias attention to 
their location (e.g., Ohman et al., 2001; Algom et al., 2004). However, the consequences of 
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this process are poorly understood, with one of the only well-documented phenomena 
being a subsequent delayed disengagement of spatial attention from a threatening object 
post-capture (e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006), implying that spatial attention is not 
only drawn to a threatening object but also becomes heavily prioritized and ‘held’ at that 
location. The present study examined whether a similar process could occur non-spatially 
for threat-related visual features, assessing whether processing threat would equally result 
in a narrowing or increased prioritization of attentional selection related to the object’s 
features. This, in turn, could influence subsequent biases in attention to prioritize new 
objects in the environment that match these features. This hypothesis was supported in 
Experiment 1 in that individual differences in trait anxiety, noted to be a critical determinant 
in eliciting attentional biases to threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), were positively correlated 
with attentional biases towards threat-associated color features. In other words, the higher 
one’s trait anxiety level, the more strongly a task-irrelevant green angry face resulted in 
slower subsequent RTs to a target when presented alongside a green non-target object, 
demonstrating a rapidly-formed attentional bias to threat-associated visual features. In 
Experiment 2, it was assessed whether the role of trait anxiety in this phenomenon was due 
to increased initial capture by threat-related stimuli or due to a formed association between 
threat and color features. By making face cues task-relevant and requiring encoding and 
maintenance in visual memory, a color bias in attentional selection now occurred unrelated 
to differences in trait anxiety levels. Crucially though, this effect also occurred regardless of 
the emotional expression conveyed by the face cues. This suggests that color-associated 
attentional biases occur following the depth of processing an initial cue receives, and not 
from the threat value of the cue or one’s trait anxiety level per se.  
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It is important to note that associative biases in attention, and particularly related to 
threat-associated information, are in and of themselves not a new result. Much work has 
shown that evaluative conditioning can lead to a change in the affective value of a stimulus 
via repeated association (see e.g., De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Moreover, it has 
previously been shown that color stimuli can be conditioned to be associated with threat 
when predictive of a physical danger, such as an electrical shock, resulting in attentional 
biases towards this color even when it is no longer predictive of danger (e.g., Notebaert et 
al., 2010; 2011; 2013; see also general reviews on fear conditioning, e.g., Lonsdorf et al., 
2017). However, in these previous studies, associations are learned across repeated 
exposures, whereas in the present study the color of face cues was randomly changed each 
trial. These results therefore demonstrate a rapid and transient mechanism, occurring on a 
single-trial basis, towards the color related to an initial face cue. However, the finding in 
Experiment 2 that memorized face cues elicited an associated color bias in attention 
regardless of the face cue’s emotional valence suggests that the mechanisms underlying the 
findings in the current study are not due to evaluative associations with threat per se.  
Rather, results suggest that attending to an object and encoding it into visual 
working memory is sufficient to elicit a bias in attention towards features related to that 
object. This complements previous evidence that specifically the contents of visual working 
memory can rapidly guide visual attention. For example, if participants encode a green 
object in visual working memory and, while retaining this information, are presented with a 
separate visual search task, task-irrelevant green objects in this display cause a distractor 
cost to response times (e.g., Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; Soto, Hodsoll, 
Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008). Moreover, event-related potential markers associated with 
visual working memory representation are observed in response to cued features 
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designating targets for upcoming visual search displays (Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & Woodman, 
2011), implying that feature biases are coordinated in visual memory, and loading visual 
working memory processes disrupts feature-guided attention (e.g., Woodman, Luck, & 
Schall, 2007; Berggren & Eimer, 2018).  
This account can accommodate not only the finding in Experiment 2 that encoded 
face cues biased subsequent attention to distractors matching the color of these cues, but 
also the results of Experiment 1. The finding that high anxious individuals were susceptible 
to a threat-associated color bias in attention could be explained if assuming that anxious 
individuals not only prioritize attention to a threatening face object, even when it is task-
irrelevant, but also actively encode this information into visual working memory. This 
account is supported by previous observations that the presentation of task-irrelevant 
threat not only interferes with the encoding of task-relevant objects within visual working 
memory tasks, but also appears to itself be readily maintained in visual memory as reflected 
by event-related markers of visual working memory maintenance during short retention 
intervals (e.g., Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013; Stout, Shackman, Pedersen, Miskovich, & 
Larson, 2017). This suggests that anxious individuals show a tendency to deeply process an 
encountered threat object, even when this is task-irrelevant, which can therefore give rise 
to subsequent attentional biases to visual features forming part of this object. However, this 
was not the case in Experiment 2, where no association between trait anxiety level and 
color presence costs following angry face cues was observed. The crucial change in 
Experiment 2, whereby face cues were made task-relevant and required memorization, 
encouraged all participants to deeply encode face cues. This likely eliminated the effect of 
trait anxiety as observed in Experiment 1, as in that case anxiety was associated with task-
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irrelevant encoding of threat-related objects, whereas making face cues task-relevant 
produced ceiling levels of encoding regardless of anxiety and the affective value of the cues.  
This account raises the implication that other phenomena observed in anxiety may 
potentially stem from a similar cause. Specifically, the finding that anxious individuals also 
show a delayed disengagement of spatial attention following capture by a task-irrelevant 
threatening object could feasibly be a consequence of task-irrelevant visual working 
memory encoding of threat-related objects in the visual field. Indeed, when memorizing a 
visual object, this is believed to involve sensory recruitment mechanisms where visual 
information is represented in a spatiotopic fashion (e.g., Franconeri, Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 
2013), with active maintenance controlled by attention to specific locations. In this sense, 
the processing of task-irrelevant threat in anxiety may lead to irrelevant visual working 
memory encoding, which can both impede the disengagement of spatial attention and 
disengagement from threat object attributes at the level of feature-based attention. This 
conclusion also has implications to the terminology used to operationalize attentional 
differences in anxious populations. Based on classic work on arousal and visual attention 
(e.g., Easterbrook, 1959), attention in anxiety has been described as being ‘narrowed’ 
towards threatening objects, or ‘broadened’ when discussing threat vigilance behavior (e.g., 
Eysenck, 1992), placing heavy emphasis on spatial factors. The present study suggests that 
the general terms of ‘decreased’ or ‘increased’ attentional selectivity are perhaps more 
fitting, as biases in attention related to threat in anxiety can equally occur within non-spatial 
aspects of attention, and to new objects at alternative locations to that of an initial threat 
object in the visual field.  
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It is notable that in Experiment 2 of the current study, encoding a face cue into visual 
working memory was sufficient to elicit a bias in attention towards cue-matching color 
objects regardless of cue emotional expression or anxiety. Previous investigations have 
found that while information currently held in visual working memory can guide subsequent 
attention, this is usually dependent on the task-relevance of the specific features currently 
being maintained, with only active features from an object encoded into working memory 
rapidly guiding attention (e.g., Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006). By contrast, in 
Experiment 2 of the current study, participants were asked to memorize the identity of face 
cues, and while color formed part of this object it did not require active memorization itself. 
This therefore suggests that all features related to the maintained object were able to guide 
attention. That said, results in Experiment 2 could be a reflection of the type of stimuli that 
were maintained in visual working memory (i.e., faces resulting in holistic object processing; 
Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998), or due to temporal variations from the relatively 
short inter-stimulus interval used in the current study versus other studies (e.g., Olivers et 
al., 2006). Clarifying these possible factors in future research would elucidate how 
maintained object representations in visual working memory impact the guidance of 
attention during search.  
Finally, it is possible that findings in the current study may not reflect a role of visual 
working memory, but rather of ‘selection history’ (e.g., Awh et al., 2012). This account 
proposes that attention can be rapidly biased by previous experience and search history, 
producing for example a strong bias towards red objects if ‘red’ has been recently selected 
in a previous object and so primed for future selection. This account could explain why 
anxiety was associated with an increased bias to colors associated with threatening stimuli 
in Experiment 1, if assuming that anxious individuals were unable to prevent selection of 
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task-irrelevant angry face cues. It can moreover accommodate findings in Experiment 2, as 
participants were encouraged to attend to all face cues and subsequent color biases were 
observed for all conditions irrespective of individual differences in trait anxiety. A key 
challenge for future research will be to dissociate this selection history model from a visual 
working memory account, which would provide insight particularly in relation to the role of 
anxiety in selective attention to threat. Indeed, it is possible that associative biases in 
attention seen in anxious individuals following attentional capture by threat might reflect a 
combination of both task-irrelevant visual working memory representation of threatening 
objects and biases due to selection history.  
 In summary, the current study demonstrates that trait anxiety is associated with 
rapidly-formed biases in attention towards task-irrelevant threat-associated visual features. 
This phenomenon, however, is not unique to threat or anxiety per se, and can seemingly 
also occur for relevant objects in the environment that are actively attended and encoded 
into visual working memory, regardless of their threat value and regardless of personality 
factors. This suggests that anxious individuals may be prone to not only attend to task-
irrelevant threat but also deeply encode such objects to the level of visual working memory, 
giving rise to associative biases in feature-based attention. These findings imply that other 
observed phenomena in selective attention related to anxiety, such as delayed 
disengagement of spatial attention from threat, may also stem from task-irrelevant visual 
working memory encoding.  
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Table 1: Mean reaction time in milliseconds (upper row) and percentage error rate (lower 
row) data as a function of Emotion and Color Validity in Experiment 1. Standard deviations 
are presented in parentheses.  
 Color Presence 
Face Expression Present Absent 
Neutral 774 (105) 
11 (9) 
778 (98) 
13 (9) 
Happy 775 (96) 
12 (8) 
771 (101) 
12 (8) 
Angry 787 (107) 
12 (9) 
773 (100) 
12 (8) 
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Table 2: Mean reaction time in milliseconds (upper row) and percentage error rate (lower 
row) data as a function of Emotion and Color Validity in Experiment 2. Standard deviations 
are presented in parentheses.  
 Color Presence 
Face Expression Present Absent 
Neutral 810 (100) 
10 (7) 
803 (101) 
10 (8) 
Angry 810 (106) 
10 (7) 
794 (103) 
10 (8) 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: Example experimental trial used in Experiment 1 (not to scale). Participants initially 
viewed a pair of identical face stimuli presented either side of fixation. These faces 
displayed either neutral, happy, or angry expressions, and were filtered to appear in 
different possible colors. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to ignore these faces, 
and subsequently respond to visual search displays. Here, four square objects were 
presented around fixation, each containing a small gap in one of their sides. The target was 
defined as the object with a gap in its top or bottom side, with participants responding to 
which target orientation was present. Importantly, all square objects were presented in 
different colors. On color-present trials (as shown here), one of the non-target squares 
matched the color of the initial face cue. On color-absent trials, the color of the initial face 
cue did not appear as an object color in search displays. In Experiment 2, face cues were 
now designated task-relevant: participants were asked to memorize the identity of the face 
shown. On two-thirds of trials, a visual search display was subsequently shown, and 
participants responded to this as in Experiment 1 and could discard memorizing the face 
cue. On the other one-third of trials, search displays were replaced by a memory probe 
display containing two grayscale faces, with participants judging whether this face image 
matched or mismatched the preceding cue face’s identity.  
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot demonstrating the positive correlation between self-reported trait 
anxiety score and color presence costs (i.e., color-present RT minus color-absent RT) 
following an angry face cue in Experiment 1.  
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